A 2027 U.S.–China conflict with Australia aligned to the U.S. China trade stops immediately, Taiwan exports are slowed/limited, and China launches large‑scale cyber disruption in waves. Planning scenario, not a forecast. No end date is set.
The U.S. shock is lost imported processed minerals and metals, not a shutdown of domestic iron ore, copper, zinc, or coal. China supplied 71 percent of U.S. rare-earth compounds and metals. Malaysia supplied 13 percent, Japan 5 percent, and Estonia 5 percent, and USGS states those compounds and metals were derived from mineral concentrates and chemical intermediates produced in Australia, China, and elsewhere.
Domestic rare-earth concentrates still exist. An estimated 51,000 tons of rare-earth oxide in mineral concentrates was produced and valued at $240 million. The estimated value of compound and metal imports was $165 million. Net import reliance for compounds and metals was 67 percent. Net import reliance for mineral concentrates was E, the USGS code for a net exporter.
Natural graphite has no U.S. mine. Companies consumed an estimated 71,000 tons valued at $128 million. Net import reliance for natural graphite was 100 percent. China supplied 46 percent of U.S. natural graphite imports in 2021–24. Canada supplied 13 percent, Mozambique 13 percent, and Mexico 12 percent, and those three keep shipping if China trade stops.
The short-horizon price analog is antimony, not a year-over-year peak. The average monthly price nearly doubled from $9.8 per pound in August to $18.10 per pound in December after China announced restrictions and then banned all antimony exports to the United States. The four-month antimony price rise was 84.7 percent, calculated as (18.10 minus 9.8) divided by 9.8 and rounded to one decimal. Oxide imports were 66 percent China. Ore and concentrates were 86 percent Mexico.
Domestic iron ore is a steel feedstock, not a China-import business. Eight open-pit mines shipped 98 percent of usable product to the U.S. steel industry. Production value was $3.38 billion. Domestic iron ore production was 38 million tons. Import sources were Brazil 58 percent, Canada 21 percent, Sweden 10 percent, and Chile 4 percent. China is not on that list.
Coal exports continue to non-China buyers. EIA Table 7, in short tons, shows 2024 year-to-date exports of 107,588,427. India was 25,192,931 and China was 12,416,543. The China share of that export total, calculated as 12,416,543 divided by 107,588,427, is 11.5 percent. The India share, calculated the same way from 25,192,931, is 23.4 percent. Japan was 9,068,838 and South Korea was 4,706,221.
Taiwan exposure in the opened chapters is a metal form, not mining electronics. Magnesium sheet, powder, and other was 9 percent Taiwan. Magnesium alloys were 11 percent Taiwan. Those metal-form shares are not equipment. The 2024 U.S. import table for HS 8431, parts used with headings 8425 to 8430, has no Taiwan row. Other Asia, nes on that table is not Taiwan. A mining-equipment electronics share and a processing-chemical share were not printed.
Week-1 cyber risk sits on ports and rail. Norfolk shipped 41,636,341 short tons of coal in 2024 year-to-date and Baltimore shipped 25,708,846, both from EIA Table 13. The opened port analog is physical, not a cyber day count: shipments from the port's two coal-loading terminals had stopped for almost two months. In April, only 63,658 short tons of coal could be loaded for export. An exact day count was not printed. Wave tags below are planning assignments on the CISA infrastructure alert.
A China trade stop removes the China slice of processed minerals. It does not remove domestic iron-ore shipments to U.S. steel, domestic copper mine output valued at an estimated $11 billion, or manganese ore from Gabon. Gabon supplied 64 percent of U.S. manganese ore imports, South Africa 24 percent, and Mexico 12 percent. Net import reliance for manganese was 100 percent, and China is not on the ore list.
Refined copper continues from Chile, Canada, Peru, and Mexico. Refined copper import sources were Chile 68 percent, Canada 16 percent, Peru 7 percent, and Mexico 6 percent. Ore and concentrate imports were more than 99 percent Canada. Net import reliance was 57 percent. China is not on the refined-copper list.
Lithium, cobalt, nickel, and zinc are not China-origin stories on the printed U.S. source lists. Lithium imports were Chile 54 percent and Argentina 43 percent. Cobalt metal, oxide, and salts were Norway 26 percent, Finland 16 percent, Canada 14 percent, and Japan 14 percent. Primary nickel was Canada 44 percent, Norway 11 percent, Australia 8 percent, and Brazil 7 percent. Refined zinc was Canada 57 percent and Mexico 15 percent.
Fluorspar continues mainly from Mexico. Import sources were Mexico 64 percent, Vietnam 12 percent, China 10 percent, and South Africa 9 percent. The salient table, in thousand metric tons, prints total fluorspar imports of 380 in the latest column. USGS states that hydrofluoric acid is used in the processing of primary aluminum and uranium. A separate uranium import-source share was not opened, so no uranium percent is stated.
Mineral sands split by form. Zirconium ores and concentrates were South Africa 48 percent and Australia 35 percent. Zirconium compounds were China 41 percent. Unwrought zirconium was China 55 percent. Through July, U.S. rutile imports were led by Australia at 51 percent. Synthetic rutile was led by Sierra Leone at 78 percent and China at 21 percent.
Coal's China exposure is an export slice, measured in short tons, not a domestic mine shutdown. India remains the largest destination in Table 7. Japan and South Korea remain on the book. The export table does not measure domestic burn.
Taiwan restriction is not established as a mining-equipment electronics stop. The searched USGS chapters print Taiwan only on magnesium alloys at 11 percent and on sheet, powder, and other at 9 percent. Those metal-form shares are not equipment. The 2024 HS 8431 partner table has no Taiwan row. Other Asia, nes is not Taiwan. No processing-chemical Taiwan share was found.
Week-1 infrastructure disruption is a separate path from the trade stop. Ports and rail move the coal and ore that still has a buyer. Cyber wave order is planning inference from the CISA alert, not a measured mining-incident series.
In-quarter operational analog for a bulk port: shipments from the port's two coal-loading terminals had stopped for almost two months. In April, only 63,658 short tons of coal could be loaded for export, compared with 2.3 million short tons in April 2023. USGS prints no one-month or one-week antimony price. The four-month antimony price rise was 84.7 percent, and that four-month price window is outside the 90-day window. The annual $25 average is not this band.
Outside the 90-day window, the four-month antimony price rise was 84.7 percent, from $9.8 per pound in August to $18.10 per pound in December. The prices increased an additional 52 percent by June, and the European germanium metal path from $3,150 to $5,380 per kilogram is a nine-month print. The calculated nine-month germanium metal price rise was 70.8 percent. Tungsten concentrate moved from $266 to $551 per metric ton unit through the year, without a 90-day date on the page.
The calculated annual antimony price rise was 144.1 percent, from an annual average of $10.24 per pound to $25. Gallium was about 30 percent higher at $580 per kilogram. Aluminum tariffs moved from 25 percent to 50 percent for most countries inside one year, which is a policy cost analog for metal, not a China-share measure.
Week-1 critical infrastructure. For this industry that is bulk ports and Class I rail, direct, and inland trucking, indirect. Norfolk and Baltimore are the printed coal-tonnage districts. The measured port analog is physical: In April, only 63,658 short tons of coal could be loaded for export, after shipments stopped for almost two months. The CISA alert is the threat frame. An exact cyber-outage day count was not printed, and the assignment of nodes is planning inference.
Enterprises: iron-ore mines, copper mines and smelters, coal mines, critical-mineral importers, equipment-parts importers, commodity traders, and primary aluminum smelters. Direct hits on their operating and commercial systems.
Smaller firms after the infrastructure and enterprise waves: assay laboratories and mining contractors, both direct on this map.
origin sharepercent
China supplied 71 percent of U.S. rare-earth compounds and metals.
USGS MCS 2026 rare earthsCanada supplied 28 percent of U.S. gallium metal imports
USGS MCS 2026 galliumGabon supplied 64 percent of U.S. manganese ore imports
USGS MCS 2026 manganeseprice changepercent
The four-month antimony price rise was 84.7 percent.
USGS MCS 2026 antimonyThe prices increased an additional 52 percent
USGS MCS 2026 antimonyThe calculated annual antimony price rise was 144.1 percent.
USGS MCS 2026 antimonyport loadingshort tons
In April, only 63,658 short tons of coal could be loaded for export
EIA Today in Energyworkforcepeople
Copper mine and plant employment was 13,000.
USGS MCS 2026 coppervolumemillion metric tons
Domestic iron ore production was 38 million tons.
USGS MCS 2026 iron oreratespercent
Net import reliance for natural graphite was 100 percent.
USGS MCS 2026 graphiteMexico supplied 86 percent of U.S. antimony ore and concentrate imports.
USGS MCS 2026 antimonySplit the buy book by form. Keep Mexican antimony ore, Gabon manganese ore, Chilean lithium, and Chilean and Canadian refined copper on a different risk line from Chinese rare-earth compounds, graphite, antimony oxide, and germanium metal.
Do not treat Malaysia, Japan, or Estonia rare-earth compounds as China-free metal. USGS says those imports were derived from concentrates and intermediates produced in Australia, China, and elsewhere.
For coal, watch Norfolk and Baltimore tonnes, not a national mine shutdown. The China export slice is 11.5 percent of 2024 year-to-date exports, calculated from the Table 7 tonnes.
Ask equipment vendors for the origin of drives and sensors. The mineral chapters do not contain that share. The only printed Taiwan shares are magnesium metal forms.
Antimony metal price, four-month change. Act when a tracked antimony or China-linked oxide price rises more than 40 percent over four months. The printed path was 84.7 percent, from $9.8 to $18.10 per pound. Forty percent is a planning line under that analog, not a USGS rule.
Natural graphite arrivals from Canada, Mozambique, and Mexico. Act when the combined share of Canada, Mozambique, and Mexico falls below 30 percent of graphite imports. Their printed shares were 13, 13, and 12 percent, which sum to 38 percent. Thirty percent is a planning line under that sum, not a published covenant.
Refined copper net import reliance. Act when refined-copper net import reliance prints above 70 percent. The last chapter print was 57 percent. Seventy percent is a planning line set above that baseline, not a USGS threshold.
Norfolk or Baltimore coal throughput. Act when either Norfolk or Baltimore coal exports run more than 50 percent below the 2024 year-to-date pace for two consecutive weeks. Norfolk's year was 41,636,341 short tons and Baltimore's was 25,708,846. Fifty percent is a planning line. An exact closure-day count was not printed. The opened analog is almost two months. In April, only 63,658 short tons of coal could be loaded for export.
Gallium consumer stocks. Act when gallium consumer stocks print below 3,400 kilograms, the yearend stock on the page, or when the metal unit value holds above $580 per kilogram. The 3,400 kilogram line is the printed stock, used here as a planning floor, not a cover-day covenant. Days of cover were not published.
Contract the non-China shares that are already printed: Canada, Mozambique, and Mexico for graphite; Mexico for antimony ore; Belgium and Canada for germanium dioxide.
Treat Malaysia, Japan, and Estonia rare-earth compounds as possibly China-feedstock material.
Size liquidity to the $165 million rare-earth import bill and the 84.7 percent four-month antimony analog.
Keep the domestic order book. Iron ore is 98 percent U.S. steel. Refined copper is Chile and Canada. Coal's China slice is 11.5 percent of exports.
Put the outage playbook on Norfolk, Baltimore, and the serving railroads. Iron ore and copper do not have a China sales book on the opened pages.
Hold carbide and reagent cover. The reagent country share was not printed. Tungsten was 26 percent China.
Treat Canada at 56 percent as the continuing metal source and China at 3 percent as the slice that stops.
Reprice power and metal against the observed step from a 25 percent tariff to 50 percent for most countries.
Use Norfolk's 41,636,341 short tons and Baltimore's 25,708,846 short tons as the coal cargo baseline.
Assume week-1 cyber priority is the port and the railroad, with trucking indirect.
Plan for a later direct wave, after ports and enterprise mines.
Do not invent a site count. None was printed.
Antimony metal price against the December print of $18.10 per pound and the August print of $9.8 per pound. The four-month rise was 84.7 percent.
Share of natural graphite arrivals from Canada, Mozambique, and Mexico against the 13, 13, and 12 percent baselines. China was 46 percent.
Gallium metal unit value against $580 per kilogram, and consumer stocks against 3,400 kilograms.
Norfolk and Baltimore coal export pace against 41,636,341 and 25,708,846 short tons for the 2024 year. A weekly series was not printed, so the annual district totals are the baseline.
Refined copper receipt share from Chile and Canada against 68 percent and 16 percent. Net import reliance baseline is 57 percent.
Cyber wave order is a planning model tied to the CISA Volt Typhoon alert. It is not a count of attacks on mines or labs. Ports and Class I rail are Wave 1 direct. Inland trucking is Wave 1 indirect. Assay labs and contractors are Wave 3 direct.
Calculated figures, and both inputs are printed on the cited page. Antimony four-month rise 84.7 percent from $9.8 and $18.10. Annual antimony rise 144.1 percent from $10.24 and $25. Germanium nine-month rise 70.8 percent from $3,150 and $5,380. Coal China export share 11.5 percent from 12,416,543 and 107,588,427 short tons. Coal India share 23.4 percent from 25,192,931 and 107,588,427. Each quotient is rounded to one decimal.
Unpublished primaries, stated as limits rather than filled with a proxy. No Taiwan share of mining-equipment electronics. Metal-form shares are not equipment, and the HS 8431 table has no Taiwan row. Other Asia, nes is not Taiwan. No processing-chemical country share. No uranium import-source share. No Class I coal-rail percentage. No exact port-closure day count. The opened analog is almost two months at Baltimore. In April, only 63,658 short tons of coal could be loaded for export. The four-month antimony price rise of 84.7 percent is outside the 90-day window. No assay-lab census. No days of gallium cover. Magnesium Taiwan shares of 9 percent and 11 percent are metal forms. The tungsten 60 percent use share includes oil and gas drilling. EIA tonnes are short tons and are not converted to metric tons.
pubs.usgs.govwits.worldbank.orgeia.govpubs.usgs.govpubs.usgs.goveia.govpubs.usgs.govpubs.usgs.gov
Tripwires at 40 percent, 30 percent combined graphite share, 70 percent copper reliance, a 50 percent district-export drop, and 3,400 kilograms of gallium stocks are planning lines set against the printed baselines in decision_guidance. They are not covenants from USGS or EIA.
| Node | Primary impact | Time horizon | Cyber wave | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Iron-ore mines | Domestic pellets keep moving to U.S. steel; China is not the import source. | 0–12 months | Wave 2 (direct) | usgs.gov iron ore |
| Copper mines and smelters | Refined copper keeps coming from Chile, Canada, Peru, and Mexico; the plant set is the operational exposure. | 0–12 months | Wave 2 (direct) | usgs.gov copper |
| Coal mines | Domestic shipments continue; the China export slice is the trade loss. | 0–12 months | Wave 2 (direct) | eia.gov |
| Critical-mineral importers | Processed rare earths, graphite, gallium, antimony oxide, and germanium metal lose the China share; ore routes continue. | 0–6 months | Wave 2 (direct) | usgs.gov |
| Bulk ports | Week-1 loss of coal-export and mineral-import throughput at the named districts. | 0–3 months | Wave 1 (direct) | eia.gov |
| Class I rail | Week-1 stoppage of coal, ore, and pellet movement if the railroad network is disrupted. | 0–3 months | Wave 1 (direct) | eia.gov |
| Inland trucking | Mine-to-rail and dock-to-plant hauls slow when ports and rail fail. | 0–3 months | Wave 1 (indirect) | eia.gov |
| Equipment-parts importers | No U.S. China parts bill was opened; the quantified gap is the processed-mineral book. | 0–12 months | Wave 2 (direct) | usgs.gov tungsten |
| Assay laboratories | Grade and shipment assays pause if smaller labs are hit after the infrastructure wave. | 1–12 months | Wave 3 (direct) | usgs.gov |
| Commodity traders | China-linked oxides reprice off the antimony and germanium paths. | 0–6 months | Wave 2 (direct) | usgs.gov antimony |
| Primary aluminum smelters | Six smelters keep a Canada-weighted metal supply; China is a 3 percent slice. | 0–12 months | Wave 2 (direct) | usgs.gov aluminum |
| Mining contractors | Contract drilling and outage work follow mine cash and carbide-tool supply. | 1–12 months | Wave 3 (direct) | usgs.gov |